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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA M. MAY, I 
Plaintiff and I 
Respondent, 
I 
VS. 
I Case No. 
GEORGE H. MAY, 
I 
Defendant and 
Appellant. I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in divorce where custody of the 
parties' minor child was the main point of controversy. 
DISPOSITION IN TEE LOWER COURT 
On March 20, 1980, the matter was tried before the 
Honorable Thornley K. Swan, sitting without a jury. Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, along with a Decree of Divorce 
were signed April 7, 1980, and filed April 8, 1980. ·The 
Decree of Divorce to become final thirty (30) days after 
entry. The decision of the court as nemorialized in the Decree 
of Divorce incorporated the parties' oral stipulation regarding 
property division and child support, and further granted 
custody of the minor child to the respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellent seeks to reverse and remand the decision 
of the District Court. 
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STATEMEl:I' OF F.ACTS 
On or about August 30, 1979, the respondent filed 
an action for divorce in the District Court in and for Davis 
County (R. 1-5). In response to the respondent's action, 
appellant answered and filed a Counter-Affidavit to rebut 
the allegations of respondent's Affidavit in connection with 
her Order to Show Cause (R. 8-15). 
On October 25, 1979, a Show Cause hearing was held 
before the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, and the parties orally 
stipulated as to the necessary terms (R. 20), 
On January 28, 1980, the parties and their 
respective counsel appeared before the Honorable Thornley K. 
Swan for a Pre-Trial Conference. The minute entry for the 
conference specifically notes that counsel conferred with the 
court and stipulated that a home study be made by the Division 
of Family Services, with each party to pay one-half of the 
cost of the study (R. 26). 
Subsequent to the Pre-Trial Conference, the appellant 
attempted to contact his attorney on several occasions prior 
to the trial. Appellant left messages for his counsel to 
return his telephone calls and none were returned until one 
day before the trial. On returning appellant's telephone 
call, his counsel advised appellant that he would not appear 
in court for the trial due to a fee dispute (R. 41). When 
the appellant retained counsel he paid Three Rundred ($300.00) 
Dollars to the attorney after being advised that Three Hundred 
-2-
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($300.00) Dollars, plus costs, was his fee for representation 
in appellant's case. Later counsel demanded an additional 
Three Hundred ($300.00) Dollars from appellant and represented 
he would not attend the trial without payment, 
Appellant's counsel indicated to appellant that due to the 
fee dispute, he would contact the court and seek permission to 
withdraw from the case and further, seek a continuance to 
permit appellant to find new counsel. Appellant's counsel did 
contact the court and was informed that neither requst would 
be granted (R 31, 47), Appellant, not being aware of the 
court's decision, attempted to reach his attorney to determine 
how the matter would proceed, Arpellant was unsuccessful in 
reaching his lawyer; however, late that afternoon, Hr. White's 
secretary called appellant and advised him that the judge would 
not allow the continuance and would not allow Hr. \..'hite to 
withdraw from the case. The secretary further informed 
appellant that she did not know whether Mr, White was going to 
attend the trial (R, 422. 
Upon hearing the representations of lfr, White's 
secretary, appellant made efforts to reach those witnesses he 
wished to testify on his behalf, although he had no subpoenas, 
nor was he familiar with the process involved in their service, 
During the hectic hours, appellant rer:iained uncertain whether his 
attorney would attend the trial (R. 42}, 
The following day, at the time set for the trial, 
Mr. White did appear, but was reluctant to represent the 
appellant due to the differences regarding fees. Appellant 
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informed the court of the problems and sought a continuance 
based upon the fact that his counsel had not adequately 
prepared appellant's case in failing to subpoena certain 
witnesses that appellant desired and that were crucial for 
the custody issue; further, that counsel was not desirous 
of representing appellant and that thereby he could not have 
a fair trial. 
The relief sought by appellant was denied and the 
trial took place without the witnesses crucial for appellant, 
Subsequently appellant obtained new counsel, A 
Motion for a New Trial and Affidavit in support thereof were 
then filed on appellant's behalf (R, 41-44L, Counter-Affidavits 
were filed by respondent and appellant's former counsel and 
the matter came before Judge Swan on April 15 1 1980 (R. 54L, 
On April 23, 1980, the court denied appellant's Motion and 
an Order reflecting the decision was filed on April 25, l980 
(R, 62L. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRF.TION IN FAILING TO GRANT 
CONTINUAHCE REQUESTED BY APPELLANT. 
It is well settled that the decision on whether to 
grant a request for continuance is within the discretion of 
the trial court. In Griffiths v, Har=on, 560 P, 2d 1375 
(Utah, l979L, the Utah Supreme Court announced: 
A party is not granted a continuance as 
a matter of right, but rather as an action 
of discretion by the court., ,560 P, 2d at 1376, 
-4-
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In the case at bar the trial court abused its discretion in 
permitting the trial to take place, and thus denying appellant 
a fair hearing. 
Our legal system is founded upon the notion that 
everyone is entitled to be heard. An important part of the 
right to be heard is the right to counsel. Obviously, the 
right to counsel in civil cases must be viewed differently than 
in criminal cases; however, proper assistance of counsel is 
necessary in both realms. 
Proper assistance of counsel was not afforded the 
appellant at the trial of the divorce action and the failure 
resulted in great loss to the appellant; namely, loss of 
custody of his child. While it is not appellant's contention 
that he should be afforded a new trial due to incompetence1 
of counsel, appellant certainly was entitled to have the trial 
of this matter continued when the trial court was advised of 
the extreme difficulties between a~pellant and his attorney, 
difficulties that would, and did, prejudice appellant. 
It is unouestioned th~t there is an implied 
covenant in an attorney's relationship to 
his client that he wili represent th~client's 
interest with competence and diligence. 
Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 
584 P. Zd (Utah, 1978) 
In appellant's case, diligence was not the watchword, and the 
lack thereof was called to the attention of the trial court. The 
1. The Utah Supreme Court in Haltbv v. Cox Con-
struction Co., Inc., 598 P. 2d 336 (Utah, 1979}, in dicta 
announced that incompetence of counsel in a civil case was 
not the grounds for a new trial. 
-5-
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trial court was advised by appellant that he was not certain 
whether counsel was even going to attend the trial on March 20, 
1980. Appellant's concern was occasioned by the events and 
conversations before the trial between appellant, his counsel, 
and his counsel's office. 
Appellant was advised by counsel that his fee for 
representing appellant in the subject matter would be Three 
Hundred ($300.00) Dollars, plus costs. Pursuant to that 
representation, appellant tendered the requested sum and 
assumed he had representation for the duration of the lawsuit. 
The representation was not always characterized by cooperative 
effort. Appellant attempted to reach his counsel on many 
occasions prior to the time set for trial, but was unsuccess-
ful (R. 41, 57). Finally, one day before trial, appellant's 
counsel returned a telephone call and advised appellant he 
would not appear at trial without an additional Three Hundred 
($300.00) Dollars, and further suggested that the matter be 
settled (R. 57). 
Appellant and his counsel were apparently unable to 
resolve their differences regarding fees and counsel unequivo-
cally stated he would not appear at trial and would contact 
the judged regarding a withdrawal (R. 57). In response, 
appellant indicated he would need time to obtain new counsel and 
asked Mr. White to request a continuance. Mr, White replied 
that the trial court would probably grant the continuance and 
that he would call the appellant later that morning with an 
answer. Appellant awaited a telephone call throughout the 
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morning, and later telephoned Mr. White's office several times, 
all to no avail. Later that evening appellant received a call 
from Hr. White's office and was told the trial court had refused 
both the withdrawal and continuance requests. !>fr. White's 
secretary further advised appellant that she did not know 
if Mr. 1.'"hite would appear in court the following day. 
It was not until appellant appeared in court the 
next morning that he knew whether or not Mr. \-.nit e would be 
present to represent him (R. 57}. Although Mr, White was 
present in court, the evidence that appellant sought to 
introduce was neither prepared nor available, After the 
Pre-Trial hearing, appellant had advised counsel that he did 
not wish to rely on the home study evaluation as the sole 
determinant for custody; rather, he desired to produce 
evidence at the time of trial which would relate to appellant's 
fitness as a custodial parent, and the lack of fitness on 
the part of the respondent, Appellant further communicated 
the nature of his evidence, and those persons whose attendance 
should be secured to his attorney. 
Appellant advised Mr. White at the original 
interview that he wished to contest the divorce, particularly 
the issue of custody, At no time did appellant advise counsel 
otherwise. Appellant indicated that some witnesses were 
reluctant to testify, and would probably require a subpoena, 
Despite appellant's representations, counsel did not discuss 
witness fees, prepare subpoenas, or converse with the witnesses 
that did appear in court prior to their testifyin3, 
-7-
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In Mageary v, Hoyt, 91 Ariz. 41, 369 P. 2d 6E2 (1962) 1 the 
Arizona Supreme Court dealt with art action against an attorney 
for constructive fraud allegedly arising out of the attorney's 
failure to inform the plaintiffs (his former clientsL of a 
discrepancy in an assignment contract, \·1hich plaintiffs claimed 
caused them to fail to extend a lease, The trial court 
granted surmnary judgment on behalf of the defendant-lawyer, 
but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that 
questions of fact existed as to whether the attorney used 
reasonable skill and knowledge, the nature of the employment 
contract and the question of proxiJ:r~te cause, In so ruling 
it was noted that: 
Certainly an attorney owes a duty of 
utmost good faith to his client, and must inform 
his client of matters that flight adversely affect 
his client's interest, Sarti v, Udall, 
91 Ariz. 24, 369 P. 2d 92 (19621 369: P, 2d 
at 665 
The logic of the Mageary decision is certainly applicable 
herein where the failure to advise the appellant whether or not 
witnesses had been subpoenaed, whether or not additional 
costs were involved, or whether or not counsel would attend 
trial, ult:illlately prejudiced the appellant to such an extent 
as to deprive him of a fair hearing, This failure to prepare 
evidence on appellant's behalf, was called to the trial court's 
attention by appellant at the time that a continuance was 
requested (T. 14-l8}, In that vein appellant stated: 
I would like to ask for a continuance in this 
matter, I haven't had time to seek other legal 
assistance, and feel that ny best interests,: .. 
-8-
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Well, I haven't had a chance to represent 
my best interests in this matter. I haven't 
had time to prepare a case myself personally. 
Mr. White, more or less, wasn't allowed to 
withdraw, and under the circumstances between 
him and me I don't feel we were able to get 
together what was needed, as far as evidence 
by today. (T. 14 to 15). 
A lengthy discussion on the record followed between counsel, 
the trial court and the appellant, including the testimony 
of the appellant, wherein appellant represented to the court
1 
in detail, the difficultieE he had encountered with ris 
attorney and the lack of key witnesses crucial to his case. 
(T. 14 to 41) 
The court had been ma.de aware of the difficulties 
prior to the time of trial, and still failed to grant the. 
continuance to the appellant. The minute entry of Harch 20, 
1980, specifically notes that Mr. vlhite contacted the trial 
judge one day prior to the trial and requested permission to 
withdraw (R. 3l-32). The decision reacred by the trinl coi.;rt 
deprived appellant of a fair hearing and worked a great 
injustice, 
The judiciary is naturally concerned with the adin.inistra-
tion of a great number of cases and the need to complete 
hearings as scheduled; however: 
. . . . a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness 
in the fact of a justifiable request for delay 
can render the request to defendant with 
counsel an empty fonnality, Ungar v. Sarafite, 
376 U.S. 515, 589 (19641 referring to Chandler v, 
Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 
-9-
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Fhile Ungar 2 involved a criminal contempt matter 1 the 
language quoted above is equally applicable to the case at 
bar. The trial court, in an attempt to administer its case-
load, rejected a justifiable reouest for continuance, 
There are no mechanical tests for deciding 
when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary 
as to violate due process, The answer must 
be formed in the circumstances uresent in every 
case particularly in the reason presented to 
the trial judge at the time the request is 
denied. Nilva v. U.S., 352 U,S, 388 
Ungar v, Sarafite, Supra at 589 
The facts in this case show a justifiable request for a 
continuance that was denied through abuse of discretion, 
causing the appellant to be denied a fair hearing, 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN APPLYING A RE:PF.ALED 
STATUTE TO TFE ISSUE OF CUSTODY 
Prior to the 1977 revision, 30~3~10 of the 
Utah Code authorized the court, in its decision of custody 
in divorce matters to consider the "natural presUI!lption 
that the mother is best suited to care for the young 
children". The legislature's decision to remove that 
presu:nption from the law is part of a societal attempt to 
remove the badges of sexism in considering such matters, TO.is 
2, Ungar v. Sarafite, Suh:i;a, involved a defendant 
charged with criminal contempt for is conduct as a witness 
in a state criminal trial, The Supreme Court found no abuse 
of discretion in denying the defendant's request for a 
continuance, even though his claim was that evidence was not 
available; however, the evidence was easilv obtainable 
within a matter of hours and defendant had' already received 
nu:nerous continuances. 
-10-
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court has announced its support of the change in the law 
and stated: 
.... under the modern trend of social thinking 
away from former fixed rigidities, towards 
equality of the sexes and greater flexibility 
in considering the qualifications of the parents 
on an individual basis, that presumption is 
subordinate to the higher rule that the 
paramount concern in such cases is the best 
interest and welfare of the child. 
Bingham v. Bingham, 575 P. 2nd 703, 704 
(Utah, 1978) 
In appellant's Affidavit in support of his Notion for New 
Trial (R. 41-44), appellant states that" .... the court 
advised me, following the trial that 'Utah Statutes show 
tbe woman preference over the man in custody cases'". While 
the court did not make such a cormnent on the record it is 
a matter properly before this court for review, in light 
of appellant's Affidavit. Obviously, the trial court 
committed error in reaching its decision on custody based upon 
a repealed section of the Utah Code. 
Custody determinations, being a matter related to 
divorce, are matters of equity and the court is "necessarily 
1 h d . h d' . " 3 c ot e wit great iscretion . That great discretion 
does not permit the court to base its decision on erroneous 
interpretations of the law, Therefore, the trial court's 
determination was must be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in failing 
to grant the requested continuance and thus committed error 
3. 
(Utah, 1978) 
Henderson v. Henderson, 576 P 2d 1289 
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in rendering its decision on custody, 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the 
trial court should be reversed, 
Respectfully submitted 
FARR, KAUHW1 & BAMILTON 
By: 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILIHG 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed to 
plaintiff-respondent's attorney, C, C, PATTERSON, Attoni.ey 
at Law, 427 27th Street, Ogden, Utah, postage prepaid, this 
;)-;;>----day of September, 1980. 
Secretary 
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